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ABSTRACT
This paper updates an earlier article explaining the development of the
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme over the
years since its inception in the mid 1970s. It does so under three headings:
governmental and bureaucratic politics; Aboriginal community politics;
and persistent unemployment. The paper recognises that while the CDEP
scheme has expanded rapidly in recent years, reviews of it have frequently
identified deep-seated unresolved issues. The paper attempts to explain this
apparent paradox by identifying different types of policy analysis focusing
on internal program issues and external forces and constituencies. It is the
latter, not the former, which are seen as having been important in
determining the expansion of the CDEP scheme.
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The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme is a
Commonwealth government program in which unemployed Aborigines of
workforce age forgo their entitlements to payments from the Department of
Social Security (DSS) and work instead for a local Aboriginal community
organisation.1 Organisations receive a single three-monthly payment from
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)
approximating the social security entitlement of participating community
members, plus a loading for on-costs and capital support. The scheme has
been operating on a small scale in discrete Aboriginal communities in
remote Australia since 1977. It has, in recent years, expanded enormously:
18 communities and 1,300 participants in 1982/83; 63 communities and
6,000 participants in 1986/87; 220 communities and 22,000 participants in
1992/93. This has changed the program from accounting for 4 per cent, to
12 per cent, to over 30 per cent of the Aboriginal affairs portfolio budget
(see Table 1). It is now the most extensive program in the Aboriginal
policy arena.
In an earlier article I traced the development of the CDEP scheme to 1987
through four historical phases (Sanders 1988): debate over its inception in
the mid 1970s, a pilot operational phase in the late 1970s characterised by
severe budgetary and administrative problems and considerable criticism, a
period of review and reassessment in the early 1980s which culminated in
the emergence of new budgetary arrangements for the scheme and a period
of considerable growth and success in the years from 1983 to 1987. The
aim of this paper is to reflect further on the expansion of the scheme by
both returning to and extending my earlier analysis.
That earlier analysis concluded by suggesting that the 'golden age in the
development of the CDEP scheme may be yet just beginning' (Sanders
1988: 46). That prediction has proven correct. However, I also remember
wondering, in 1987, whether I might, in five or six years time, be writing
about the rise and fall of the CDEP scheme. I was unconvinced that the
CDEP scheme had adequately resolved many of the tensions involved in
attempting to be both a 'welfare' and a 'workforce' program. I wondered
whether this might still cause the program's demise. My written conclusion,
however, proved correct.
The closest I came to writing that other story was in 1991 when Jon
Altman and I wrote a paper on the 'unresolved policy and administrative
issues' in the CDEP scheme (Altman and Sanders 1991). That phrase was
drawn from a 1990 review of the CDEP scheme's 'funding and
administration' in which Altman had been involved. The review had
recommended a 'breathing space' in the scheme's expansion in order that
some of these 'unresolved issues' might be addressed (CDEP Working
Party 1990). The list of such issues was long. The 1990 review report
contained chapters on funding options, participant data handling, family
allowance supplement eligibility, women's participation and other
administrative issues (CDEP Working Party 1990). The analysis in our
paper discussed the unresolved issues under headings identifying: the
inadequacy of funding and administrative arrangements; marginal
eligibility differences between CDEP and social security provision; gender
considerations; the issue of what constitutes work; supplementary versus
substitution funding; under-award wages and secondary labour markets;
the adequacy of capital and on-cost provision; the issue of long-term
participant dissatisfaction with 'a life of small money'; the perverse
incentive structures involved in the use of the scheme for enterprise
support; community self-management versus individual rights; and
community self-management versus public accountability (see Altman and
Sanders 1991). Our overall analysis suggested that these issues were, in
large part, due to the scheme's attempts to be both a welfare and a
workforce program and that while that remained the case, there was little
chance of their simultaneous resolution.
In response to the 1990 review, there was some attempt to halt expansion
of the CDEP scheme in the 1990/91 budget. No new communities were to
be added to the scheme, but communities already participating could, and
did, build up participant numbers (see Table 1). During the early months of
1991, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
(RCIADIC) strongly recommended further expansion of the CDEP
scheme, despite also recognising and canvassing many of the 'criticisms'
made of the scheme (Commonwealth of Australia 1991: 425-41).
Expansion of the CDEP scheme was then firmly back on the agenda. It has
remained so ever since, despite the fact that a large number of issues within
the scheme remain unresolved. A recent national review of the CDEP
scheme captured this apparent paradox very clearly. The review was, on
the one hand, entitled No Reverse Gear, reflecting the sentiment of one
Aboriginal community chairperson who clearly felt that there was no
question of going back to DSS unemployment payments, now Jobsearch/
Newstart Allowance. On the other hand, it also stated at the outset that
there were 'some deep-seated, structural issues in relation to the future
development of the program which require attention at national and
community levels' (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993: 2).
Why has the CDEP scheme proved so durable and attractive, despite these
unresolved policy and administrative issues? To answer that question I
refer to my 1988 article and the three forces which I saw then as best
explaining the persistence and growth of the CDEP scheme: bureaucratic
politics, remote community politics and the rise of unemployment (Sanders
1988). These forces are as pertinent today as they were five or six years
ago in explaining the development of the CDEP scheme. In what follows, I
briefly reiterate and update my understanding of these three key forces
under the slightly revised labels of bureaucratic and governmental politics,
Aboriginal community politics and persistent unemployment. The final
section turns directly to the relationship between the expansion of the
CDEP scheme and those unresolved policy and administrative issues. It
argues that these unresolved issues are largely matters of internal program
logic and are the product of a certain type of rationalistic policy analysis.
That form of analysis, although it does have its uses, is not adequate to the
task of explaining the CDEP scheme's growth and development. The
expansion of the scheme has been determined by forces external to the
program. These can be better described by the more economic and political
style of policy analysis engaged in here.
Table 1. CDEP participant numbers and expenditure.
CDEP CDEP as % of
Communities Participants expenditure Aboriginal affairs
Year participating (workers) ($ million) portfolio expenditure
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1
10
12
17
18
18
18
32
33
38
63
92
129
166
169
185
220
100
500
800
700
1,300
1,300
1,300
1,700
2,900
4,000
6,000
7,600
10,800
13,800
18,266
20,000
22,000
0.1
2.0
2.9
3.8
6.9
7.0
7.4
14.2
23.5
27.2
39.5
65.5
98.8
133.2
194.1
205.0
234.0
0.1
1.6
2.1
2.7
4.3
4.1
3.7
5.8
8.3
9.2
11.9
17.4
22.0
25.0
35.8
34.7
31.2
Sources: Sanders (1988); CDEP Working Party (1990); Morony (1991); Deloitte louche Tohmatsu
(1993).
Bureaucratic and governmental politics
The term "bureaucratic polities' was used in my first article to refer to
matters of dispute within the Commonwealth Government's administration
over whether a program like the CDEP scheme should exist and, if so, how
it should be managed (Sanders 1988). The starting point for such analysis
is the clear enthusiasm for the scheme over many years of the
Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs portfolio, first as the Department of
Aboriginal affairs (DAA) and now as ATSIC. This is so, despite DAA
having considerable budgetary and administrative problems with the
scheme during its early years and despite ATSIC's continued tussling with
unresolved administrative and policy issues. The emphasis of the scheme
seems to fit nicely with the portfolio's philosophy of community-level
Aboriginal self-determination and self-management. Indeed had it not been
for the enthusiasm of the DAA, the CDEP scheme would probably never
have been established within the Commonwealth bureaucracy.
The DSS, in particular, had severe reservations about the CDEP scheme
when first proposed, fearing it would leave it open to charges of
discrimination against Aborigines in the payment of social security
benefits. The mainstream Commonwealth employment portfolio also had
reservations and initially would have preferred expanding existing
employment and training programs for Aborigines (see Interdepartmental
Working Party on Aboriginal Employment 1976). Once the DAA had
established the CDEP scheme, however, it became more difficult for these
functional line bureaucracies to maintain their resistance. The Aboriginal
affairs portfolio easily utilised the rhetoric of Aboriginal self-determination
and self-management in defence of the scheme.
Another area of bureaucratic concern over the CDEP scheme, which
emerged during the early years of its operation, related to financial and
budgetary matters. To operate as a social security equivalent, the scheme
really needed an open-ended budget in order to respond to changing
numbers of eligible individuals in participating communities. However, as
an Aboriginal affairs portfolio program, the CDEP scheme was initially
restricted to a pre-allocated budget, which the DAA could only expand by
reducing other budget items. This changed in 1983, when the Department
of Finance agreed to give the Aboriginal affairs portfolio an open-ended
budget for the wages component of the CDEP scheme in recognition of its
notional link to social security entitlement. The importance of this
concession from the Department of Finance cannot be overstated in
understanding the subsequent growth of the CDEP scheme. The budgetary
demands of participating communities, arising from changing numbers of
individual participants, could now be met by the DAA without affecting its
other budget commitments. The DAA had won for itself a partially open-
ended budget through the CDEP scheme. This was a rare achievement in
Canberra bureaucratic politics, and one that the DAA, and now ATSIC,
have retained and utilised over the years with some determination.
A related component of the CDEP scheme's expansion, which arose more
from governmental than bureaucratic politics, was its extension to larger
numbers of Aboriginal communities. The original decision for this to occur
was made in 1983 in conjunction with the open-ended budget arrangement.
However, this decision was of the Commonwealth Government's own
making and not dependent on the Department of Finance's advice. It
reflected the fact that, throughout the years of review during the early
1980s, demand for participation in the scheme from Aboriginal
communities remained very strong. Faced with such persistent demand,
neither the Fraser government in its last days, nor the new Hawke
government, could see any reason to stop the scheme expanding to new
communities once its budgetary problems had been resolved.
That 1983 decision to allow the CDEP scheme to expand to new
communities has been reinforced strongly in more recent years, as
independent government inquiries have repeatedly favoured the scheme.
The first such inquiry to do so was the Miller Committee of Review into
Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs in 1985 which endorsed
the scheme as making 'an important contribution to development of
Aboriginal economic independence' (Miller et al. 1985: 344). This
encouraged the Hawke Government, in responding to the Miller inquiry, to
make the CDEP scheme a central part of its 1987 Aboriginal Employment
Development Policy (AEDP) (Australian Government 1987a). The
Government set targets for expanding the scheme by 1,600 participants per
annum for the next two years (Australian Government 1987b: 10), which it
achieved in 1987/88 and doubled in 1988/89 (see Table 1). As noted above,
the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody performed a
similar function in 1991, providing strong independent support for a
renewed Commonwealth Government commitment to further expand the
CDEP scheme. This was particularly important for bureaucratic and
governmental politics in 1991, because of the more adverse attitude of the
CDEP working party of the previous year. The concerns of this largely
bureaucratic body were easily over-ridden by the higher status Royal
Commission. The expansion of the CDEP scheme, with the backing of the
RCIADIC, resumed, if it had ever really halted (see Table 1).
One cost to the Aboriginal affairs portfolio of both its open-ended budget
allocation and its ability to expand the CDEP scheme to ever larger
numbers of participating communities has been the ongoing interest in the
scheme of another important Canberra bureaucratic player; the Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO). The ANAO has had a number of concerns
about the operation of the CDEP scheme over the years (Auditor-General
1990, 1992). However, its most persistent concern has been with the
possibility of double payment under the CDEP scheme and social security
provisions. The CDEP scheme, in its early days, had no individualised
listing of participants and hence was impossible to check against social
security records. The ANAO insisted that an individualised listing would
need to be developed if the scheme was to expand beyond its early pilot
stage. The Aboriginal affairs portfolio undertook to develop such a listing
system back in the early 1980s, and has to some extent done so. However,
undertaking this task regularly and with a high level of accuracy has
generally proven beyond both DAA and ATSIC, particularly since the
more rapid expansion of the CDEP scheme in recent years. Accordingly,
the ANAO's concern about the possibility of double payments from the
CDEP scheme and the social security system continues to the present day
(Auditor-General 1992); as do ATSIC's efforts to meet that concern
through measures such as a recent CDEP 'census' (ATSIC 1992: 108). This
ANAO concern has not, however, greatly threatened the CDEP scheme in
recent years.
The general point to be made is that bureaucratic politics and governmental
politics still play a central role in any explanation of the development of the
CDEP scheme. The scheme has gained the support of key independent
governmental inquiries over recent years, despite their recognition of its
problems and criticisms. This has bolstered government commitment to the
scheme, when it may at times have been in danger of flagging. The scheme
has also long had the unqualified backing of the Commonwealth's
Aboriginal affairs portfolio, now ATSIC. This is partly because the scheme
accords with the portfolio's philosophy of funding and encouraging
Aboriginal community-level self-management and partly because it gives
ATSIC an open-ended budget item. Although the basic bureaucratic and
governmental battles which underlay the CDEP scheme's expansion were
now fought a decade ago, it has been necessary to defend them since. Both
DAA and now ATSIC have been determined in that defence and have been
fortunate to be backed up at opportune moments by both the Miller
Committee in 1985 and the RCIADIC in 1991. The result has been the
continuing expansion of the CDEP scheme.
Aboriginal community politics
The second strand of my explanation for the persistence and growth of the
CDEP scheme up to 1987 was its effects on remote community politics.
Firstly, the scheme had the effect of strengthening the position of authority
of local Aboriginal community councils, or other incorporated
organisations, by causing large amounts of money to flow into the
community through these bodies, rather than to individuals directly. The
second effect was the strengthening of the position of these bodies in
relation to the Commonwealth Aboriginal affairs portfolio. Since the
scheme was a notional social security equivalent, it was much easier for
these funded local bodies to assert their independence from their
Commonwealth funder. Who else, they said, had to account for the
expenditure of their social security entitlements?
These aspects of the CDEP scheme continue to explain its popularity
among Aboriginal community organisations and hence its continued
expansion. They are both augmented and complicated by the additional
financial offerings of the scheme of up to 40 per cent on-costs and capital
support. These give community councils even more incentives to be
involved in the scheme. However, they also give the Aboriginal affairs
portfolio some leverage in holding participating organisations to account
for public funds and some discretion in the allocation of funds, as not all of
this 40 per cent loading is automatically given to all participating
communities.
Since the CDEP scheme's incorporation into the 1987 AEDP, the term
'remote' can, to some extent, be dropped from the description of the key
forces underlying the growth of the scheme. The 1987 policy statement
opened the way for the expansion of the CDEP scheme into non-discrete
Aboriginal communities in more settled areas of Australia in 'situations
where Aboriginal people have no alternative employment prospects'
(Australian Government 1987a: 10). The extent of the subsequent
expansion can be readily appreciated by examining Figure 1, ATSIC's 1992
map of the location and commencement date of CDEP scheme
communities Australia-wide. Before 1988 there were no communities
participating in the scheme in New South Wales or Victoria, but by 1992
there were 34, accounting for some 1,600 participants. Some of these were
in discrete Aboriginal communities, but many were in mixed
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal communities reaching up the urban hierarchy
from small to large country towns, and even to communities within
metropolitan Sydney. Elsewhere, the scheme has also, to some extent,
moved out of the remote, discrete communities up the urban hierarchy to
places such as the Tangentyere town camps in Alice Springs, the suburbs
of Perth and the rural hinterland of south-western Australia.
This geographic expansion is one of the more interesting developments in
the CDEP scheme since my earlier article. It was made possible by
changing a policy of 'one in, all in' for communities participating in
discrete remote areas to one of having groups within a community involved
in the scheme on the basis of individual voluntarism in non-discrete
locations (Australian Government 1987b: 6). This individual voluntarism
has potentially significant implications for community politics. The exit
option for dissatisfied individual participants in a participating community
now becomes possible and the enhanced authority of the sponsoring
community organisation, in principle at least, that much less. To date there
have not been extensive reports of dissatisfied individual participants
leaving the CDEP scheme in non-discrete communities in favour of
individualised social security payments. However, this is now a possibility.
In remote areas, such an exit option is still only available if a participant is
willing to move to a non-CDEP locality; and given the growth of the
Figure 1. Location and commencement date of CDEP scheme communities, April 1992.
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scheme in recent years these are increasingly few in number. Despite the
fact that there is as yet little evidence of individual rejection of the
enhanced community authority of the CDEP scheme, this is one potential
area for further developments in the scheme in the future. One possible
scenario might be that dissatisfied individuals in remote areas could also
push for the scheme to adopt individual voluntarism in their communities,
thereby bringing the older remote area rules in line with rules in the newer
settled areas.
As with bureaucratic and governmental politics, it does seem that the
CDEP scheme's effects on community politics are still a very important
part of any explanation of its continued expansion and success.
Participation in the CDEP scheme does still help to enhance the authority
of local-level Aboriginal community organisations both in relation to their
community members and to ATSIC. The first of these points was
reinforced quite starkly during a recent visit to Palm Island. There,
participation in the CDEP scheme has transformed the local Aboriginal
council from one employing 50 people to one employing 700, albeit most
of them part-time. This is an exceptionally large number of participants, the
average number per community being around 100, but it does clearly make
the point that the CDEP scheme can greatly enhance the size and local
strength of these organisations. At Palm Island, the first major project
completed under the CDEP scheme was the construction of new Council
offices. These were needed to administer the much enlarged workforce.
Persistent unemployment
The third strand of argument in my earlier article (Sanders 1988), was that
the expansion of the CDEP scheme in the years 1983-87 had been due to
the rising tide of unemployment, not just among Aborigines, but in the
community at large. As unemployment among the general population had
gradually risen during the 1970s and early 1980s, Aboriginal
unemployment had risen with it, but at a faster rate and from a higher base
(see Table 2). Aboriginal employment to population ratios were falling
rapidly, from around 40 per cent in the early 1970s to around 30 per cent
by the mid 1980s (see Table 2). This decline was occurring not only in the
rural and remote areas, but also in major urban and other urban areas, albeit
sometimes from a slightly higher starting point (see Table 3). In such
circumstances, the finer points of the CDEP scheme's inadequate
administration and tensions between being both a workforce and a welfare
program were of little importance. What mattered was the 'big picture',
which showed a major decline in Aboriginal employment and growth in
Aboriginal unemployment. Job creation schemes were in the ascendent in
Australia, in an attempt to deal with generally rising unemployment. The
Eraser Government's Wage Pause Program and the Hawke Government's
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Community Employment Program were both strongly promoted, and the
CDEP scheme was beginning to look less out of place among employment
programs than it had in the mid 1970s. By 1986, similar 'work for the dole'
schemes were even being contemplated for Australians generally and
would-be critics of the CDEP scheme were inclined to concede that there
were no obvious alternatives to solving Aboriginal employment problems
(see Sanders 1988:45-6; Mowbray 1986).
The Hawke government, in incorporating the CDEP scheme into its much
vaunted Aboriginal Employment Development Policy (AEDP) in late
1987, was deliberately ignoring the CDEP scheme's unresolved
administrative and policy issues in pursuit of the larger task of turning
around the major decline in Aboriginal employment status. As high
unemployment has persisted over recent years, both among Aborigines and
in the larger community, further expansion of the CDEP scheme has never
really been in doubt. Other employment and training programs have joined
the CDEP scheme in specifically targeting the unemployed and citing
savings of social security entitlements as a major rationale for their
existence and expansion. The divide between 'workforce' and 'welfare'
programs has been somewhat lessened. None of the general programs,
however, have as yet gone as far as the CDEP scheme and sold themselves
as a direct social security offset.
Table 2. Labor force status of Aboriginal and total populations aged 15
years and over, 1971-91.
Year Employed Unemployed Not in labour force Population
Per cent Per cent Per cent
Aboriginal
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
Total
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
41.4
40.7
35.7
31.3
37.1
57.7
58.7
57.6
54.4
55.6
4.2
8.8
11.6
17.1
16.5
1.0
2.7
3.7
5.6
7.3
54.4
50.5
52.7
51.7
46.4
41.3
38.6
38.7
40.0
37.1
56,948
91,327
91,819
137,133
153,491
9,085,586
9,858,098
10,919,426
11,965,311
12,776,675
Source: Tesfaghiorghis and Altman (1991), Table 6; 1991 Census tables.
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Table 3. Labor force status of Aboriginal population aged 15 years and
over, 1976-91, by section-of-State.
Employed Unemployed Not in labour force
Year/section-of-State Percent Percent Percent
1976
Major urban
Other urban
Rural localities
Other rural
1986
Major urban
Other urban
Rural localities
Other rural
1991
Major urban
Other urban
Rural
49.4
35.2
32.0
41.0
40.1
30.9
27.3
30.3
42.8
34.1
40.4
8.8
11.0
6.3
8.1
16.9
19.6
14.8
17.1
18.3
20.8
11.7
41.7
53.9
61.7
50.8
43.0
49.5
57.9
52.6
38.9
45.1
47.9
Sources: Census Microfiche no. 76.505; Tesfaghiorghis and Gray (1991: 58); Taylor (1993).
Note that the data for the latter two years are for the Aboriginal population aged 15-64 years, which may
push down NILF percentages slightly in comparison to 1976, and the other categories up.
Analysis of the 1991 Census, would seem to suggest that the Hawke
government's AEDP, including the CDEP scheme, has been reasonably
successful in halting the deterioration of Aboriginal employment status.
For the first time in twenty years percentages of Aboriginal people in
employment between censuses increased, and by a quite marked 5.8 per
cent compared to 1.2 per cent for the total population (see Table 2).
However, Aboriginal unemployment only declined by 0.6 per cent, from
17.1 to 16.5 per cent. The remainder of the Aboriginal employment growth
occurred through increased labour force participation. Aboriginal
unemployment rates are still, therefore, at historically high levels,
particularly in urban areas where the impact of the CDEP scheme is still
limited. Indeed, it is only in the rural and remote areas, where the impact of
the CDEP scheme has been greatest, that Aboriginal employment has been
increasing and Aboriginal unemployment decreasing (see Table 3). With
Aboriginal unemployment persisting at these high levels, there can be little
doubt that Aboriginal employment status in the intercensal period 1986-91
would have deteriorated quite significantly were it not for the CDEP
scheme (Taylor 1993).
There is little doubt that persistent high unemployment, both among
Aborigines and in the community generally, has been extremely important
in recent years in explaining the continuing expansion of the CDEP
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scheme. Persistent unemployment has probably been more important in
explaining recent growth in the scheme than either bureaucratic,
governmental or community politics; though these forces should still not be
ignored. There has, in the face of persistent high unemployment, simply
seemed to be no alternative to the growth the CDEP scheme. The converse
of this, however, is that it is possible that as many as one-third of all
Aboriginal people now in employment work under the CDEP scheme, and
in remote areas that proportion is almost certainly higher.2
The expansion of the CDEP scheme: external forces and
constituencies, not internal issues
How do those unresolved administrative and policy issues in the CDEP
scheme, which have been so consistently identified over the years, relate to
its general expansion? Why the apparent disjunction? Why, if there are so
many unresolved issues, does the scheme continue to flourish? This is what
Stone (1988: 1) calls a 'policy paradox' and argues that 'political life is full
of them'. The paradox of the CDEP scheme can, I think, be explained by
recognising that there are different types of policy analysis to which
government programs can be subjected.
One type of policy analysis values the internal logic of a program. It is part
of what Stone (1988: 4) calls 'the rationality project1. This type of policy
analysis seeks to identify program objectives and goals and assess
programs against the achievement of those goals. Issues of concern arise
for programs where goals are unclear or unmet. The CDEP scheme,
because of its mixture of welfare and workforce goals and multiple internal
logics, is viewed unfavourably in this type of analysis. Unresolved issues
abound and an impression of a program in crisis, or at least in considerable
trouble, can easily be created.
This type of rationalistic, internal analysis of government programs does
have its uses. It has been engaged in by official reviewers of the CDEP
scheme over the years and was also, to a large extent, engaged in by
Altman and myself in 1991 (Altman and Sanders 1991). It can, in some
circumstances, lead to the resolution of issues within a program and greater
program clarity. For example, the issue of women's participation in the
CDEP scheme has recently been progressed, if not entirely resolved, by the
inclusion of Supporting Parents pensioners, if they wish, among those
included in a participating community.3 However, it is not the progression
or resolution of such internal program issues which has determined the
expansion of the CDEP scheme over the years and it is not this type of
policy analysis which best explains the scheme's expansion.
To explain the expansion of the CDEP scheme, rather than prescribe its
improvement, requires a different type of policy analysis. This analysis
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needs to be more concerned with economic and political forces external to
the program and less with internal program design. This is the type of
analysis I have attempted to engage in both here and in my 1988 article.
These accounts refer, only to very limited extent, to program goals and
internal program logic. They instead focus largely on economic, political
and bureaucratic forces external to the program. The force that looms
largest is economic; the persistently high levels of Aboriginal
unemployment. But external political and bureaucratic forces are also
apparent. These manifest themselves as interests, or constituencies, which
surround the CDEP scheme and which have required management by the
scheme's promoters.
The foregoing discussion directly suggests at least three different interests
or constituencies which the administrative promoters of the CDEP scheme
have had to manage over the years; a bureaucratic constituency, a
governmental constituency and an Aboriginal community constituency. A
more detailed account of die CDEP scheme's history would suggest at least
two others; an industrial relations constituency and a general public
constituency. ATSIC's and formerly DAA's management of these
constituencies, both in retrospect and in prospect, are worthy of a brief final
review.
The bureaucratic constituency was, in the early day of the CDEP scheme,
the most problematic one. It was other Commonwealth bureaucrats, with
their various administrative and financial concerns, who almost stopped the
scheme from coming into existence and who in the early days of its
operation restricted its expansion beyond a small pilot scale. Since 1983,
however, the bureaucratic constituency has been at least passively
supportive of the CDEP scheme, by leaving well enough alone. This is still
so, despite the continuing concerns of the ANAO, and looks like remaining
so in the future. Having lived with the CDEP scheme over the last 15 years,
the various surrounding bureaucracies have simply become accustomed to
it and its somewhat troublesome unresolved issues.
Once the bureaucratic constituency accepted the CDEP scheme, the
governmental constituency that the bureaucrats were advising easily
followed. Indeed, the Fraser Government would have expanded the CDEP
scheme considerably earlier, but for the advice of its Finance bureaucrats
and the Auditor-General. The Hawke Government also had little trouble
agreeing to the Aboriginal affairs portfolio's wishes for expansion of the
scheme, once Finance and the Auditor-General were placated. As
unemployment has risen and persisted, and dealing with long-term
unemployed people generally has become more of an issue for
governments, the support of the governmental constituency for the CDEP
scheme has become assured. This has been particularly so as independent
government inquiries such as the Miller committee and the Royal
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Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody have expressed their
support for the scheme.
The support of the Aboriginal community constituency for the CDEP
scheme has never been in doubt. The scheme has always enjoyed extensive
popularity amongst Aboriginal community organisations and, in its
troubled early days, Aboriginal affairs portfolio administrators had
considerable trouble holding back community demands for its expansion.
In the future, however, it may well be the Aboriginal community
constituency of the CDEP scheme which provides the greatest challenges
for its ATSIC managers. I base this prediction on the increasingly frequent
observation of field workers in CDEP communities, that after an initial
flush of enthusiasm, some concern is often expressed about longer-term
disenchantment with the scheme and the limited income that it can deliver
(Smith et al. 1990: 61-5; Moizo 1990: 37; Arthur 1991: 26). If Aboriginal
people become disenchanted and begin to feel that the scheme is limiting
their access to higher income and better employment, then perhaps ATSIC
will begin to have problems managing this most important of the scheme's
constituencies. It is interesting in this regard that former DAA secretary,
Charles Perkins, who nowadays operates more as a prominent member of
the Aboriginal community, recently criticised the CDEP scheme for
'deluding both governments and Aboriginal people' about Aboriginal
employment. It is not, he argued, 'employment - regardless of various
ministerial and other statements' and could, in the future run into 'immense
problems' from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Perkins 1992:
231). I do not, however, see dissatisfaction among the Aboriginal
constituency as an immediate threat to the CDEP scheme, since levels of
Aboriginal unemployment are still so very high. Aboriginal people's
dissatisfactions are more likely, at this stage, to be directed to gaining
better deals within the scheme than to its wholesale revamping or
abandonment.
Perkins' comments suggest a fourth constituency which deserves to be
mentioned, an industrial relations constituency. In the troubled early days
of the CDEP scheme, the spectre of ILO censure of the scheme was
frequently invoked. The solution of the Aboriginal affairs administrators
was to promulgate rules suggesting that CDEP participants were to be paid
part-time pro-rata award rates (see Sanders 1988: 37). This management of
the problem seemed to hold quite well during the 1980s, despite the fact
that unions still recognised that 'most CDEP schemes underpay their
workers'. The unions had been unwilling to 'interfere' with the CDEP
scheme because they recognised its "benefits' for Aboriginal people and that
community participation had been freely sought and entered into (Smith
1990). In recent years, however, as numbers have grown and the scheme
has spread geographically into larger more urban areas, the unions have
begun to question mis attitude of non-interference (Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu
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1992; Altaian and Hawke 1993). This too may be a constituency to be
reckoned with in the future.
One final constituency surrounding the CDEP scheme which needs to be
mentioned is the general public. As I argued in my earlier article,
Aboriginal affairs portfolio administrators and Aboriginal participants in
the CDEP scheme have long recognised the good 'public relations' potential
of the scheme (Sanders 1988: 45). Against a backdrop of long-standing
community ambivalence to the worthiness of the unemployed as social
security recipients, the CDEP scheme, symbolically, turns Aboriginal 'dole
bludgers' into fine upstanding members of the community who work for a
meagre living. Aboriginal people are well aware of this symbolic public
relations value of the CDEP scheme, and will not relinquish it lightly.
There is a general public constituency to which Aboriginal affairs programs
need to appeal and the CDEP scheme is particularly good at the task.
Concluding comment
There seems little evidence to suggest that the success of the CDEP scheme
is coming to an end. I suspect that the CDEP scheme will remain intact and
will continue to expand over the next few years. This expansion may be at
a somewhat slower rate than in recent years, as there is no longer such a
large pool of Aboriginal communities wanting to enter the scheme. But the
combination of bureaucratic, governmental and community politics and
persistent unemployment would seem too powerful a set of forces for the
scheme to do other than further expand. Equally ATSIC's management of
the constituencies surrounding the CDEP scheme, at this stage, seems
reasonably successful. Five years from now, the CDEP scheme will
probably operate in over 250 communities and involve more than 25,000
participants. Beyond that time frame, it is difficult to predict. Certainly five
years ago, I would never have predicted the extent of the CDEP scheme's
recent expansion.
Notes
1. The terms Aboriginal and Aborigines are used in this paper to include all
indigenous Australians, including Torres Strait Islanders.
2. The figure of one-third is based on the calculation that 56,300 Aboriginal people
were counted as being in employment at the 1991 census and some 18,300 were
then involved in the CDEP scheme. Some caution is required here, as Altaian and
Daly (1992) have demonstrated that in 1986 it was unclear where CDEP
participants were appearing in census categories. This may be partly because of
lack of clarity in census instructions, which may to some extent have been
rectified in 1991. However, it may also be because some CDEP participants are
non-working spouses and because many CDEP communities do not require that
much work of participants. Participants may, therefore, still perceive and report
themselves as unemployed or not in the labour force.
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3. I say that the issue of women's participation in the CDEP scheme has been
progressed, rather than resolved, by this move because the new arrangement has
not addressed all the apparent gender inequities in the CDEP scheme and has, in
fact, also created some new ones. What about spouses of employed Aborigines?
They still can't legally participate in the CDEP scheme. Also, what if Supporting
Parents pensioners choose to stay on their pension but would like to earn some
additional income through the CDEP scheme. This may seem fair in relation to
other Supporting Parents pensioners who can earn extra income, but is it fair in
relation to other CDEP participants who don't have that same opportunity? And
how would the Auditor-General view such an arrangement for Supporting Parents
pensioners; as legitimate earning of additional income or as a form of 'double
dipping1 on the basis of the same welfare claim?
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